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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: W as the trial court correct in determining that n,. J u ^ , not iiv t n\ ;< vk.,^  ^\t 
property was not arbitrary, capricious or illegal under the applicable statutory standard 
granting a strong presumption of validity and substantial judicial deference to Hie Ht\ 
Ui'.< ' . . ' A * ' . . 
Standard oi re\in Appellate coun "i\ \ u \\ *'v ; *: t coi lr t's si immary ji idgm snt 
ruling for correctness, granting no deference to its legal conclusions, and consider 
whether it correctly concluded that no genuine issue of material fact existed." Johnson v. 
Hermes Assoc. Ltd.. 2005 1 J 1 82. I I 11 2,1 28 P 3d 1 1 51 II 1 55(1 Jl i ih 2005). 
Preservation, ihis issue was presented to the trial court by the City's supporting and 
reply memoranda. fR. .Wl-L-\ R. 218-225.) 
p R Q V I S I Q N S Q F CONSTITUTION, STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann, § 10-9a-801(3): 
(a) The courts shall: 
(i) presume that a decision, ordinance or regulation made 
under the authority of this chapter is valid; and 
(ii) determine only whether or not the decision,, ordinance, or 
regulation is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
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(b) A decision, ordinance, or regulation involving the use of 
legislative discretion is valid if the decision, ordinance, or regulation 
is reasonably debatable and not illegal. 
(d) A determination of illegality requires a determination that the 
decision, ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or 
ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or the 
ordinance or regulation adopted. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(5) (2004): 
If the municipality has complied with Section 10-9a-205, a challenge 
to the enactment of a land use ordinance or general plan may not be 
filed with the district court more than 30 days after enactment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(8)(a): 
(i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the 
record provided by the land use authority or appeal authority, as the 
case may be. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the 
record of the land use authority or appeal authority, as the case may 
be, unless that evidence was offered to the land use authority or 
appeal authority, respectively, and the court determines that it was 
improperly excluded. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 (effective 1992, repealed 2004): 
Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise 
of the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the 
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision 
is rendered. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-405 (2004): 
Except as provided in Section 10-9a-406, the general plan is an 
advisory guide for land use decisions, the impact of which shall be 
determined by ordinance. 
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Ut; ill... Cc X i,e.„/ \ iii: i § ] 3 9 -303(< 5) (eff. 1 992, repe; ded 200 1 )::: 
(a) Ilie general plan is an advisory guide for land use decisions. 
(b) The legislative body may adopt an ordinance mandating 
compliance with the general plan. 
Logan City Land Development Code § 1.701.010: 
Land development and capital improvement projects shall be 
consistent with the General Plan. The City's administration and us 
departments shall carry out the mandate of the general plan wh<^  
reviewing project proposals, development plans, and capital 
improvement programs. 
A. Planning Commission Implementation 
The Planning Commission shall not approve any project for which it 
cannot substantiate a finding that the project is consistent with the 
goals, policies and implementation programs of the General Plan. 
B. Board of Adjustment Implementation 
The Board of Adjustment shall not approve any variance request for 
which it cannot substantiate a finding that the project is consistent 
with the goals, policies and implementation programs of the General 
Plan. 
C. Design Review Committee Implementation 
The Design Review Committee shall not approve any project for 
which it cannot substantiate a finding that the project is consistent 
with the goals, policies and implementation programs of the General 
Plan. 
E. Relationship of the General Plan to the Land Development Code 
The General Plan is the adopted policies of the Municipal Council. 
The general Plan represents a lengthy public participation process 
and incorporates long range goals, identified policies and an 
implementation program. The content of the General Plan may be 
cited as a basis for making decisions or as part of the finding to 
support actions initiated by this Land Development Code. The 
General Plan is adopted as part of this code by reference. The 
General Plan provides the policies that enable the specific 
regulations of the Land Development Code to be carried out. 
Implementation measures in the General Plan provide direction for 
specific measures within the Land Development Code. When there 
is a conflict between the General Plan and the Land Development 
Code, if the General Plan provides precise development standards, 
the General Plan is to be used. If the General Plan provides policy 
language and no specific development standards, the Land 
Development Code's specific measures are to prevail, (emphasis 
added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a challenge to the exercise of legislative discretion by the Logan Municipal 
Council arising from the City's enactment of an ordinance in 1989 rezoning the Tolmans' 
property from multi-family to single-family zoning and the subsequent denial in 2004 of 
an application for a zone change of the property back to a higher density multi-family use. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
In June of 2004, Tolmans applied to the City for a rezoning of their property and 
those of others similarly situated. (R. 106-109.) After review by the City's planning staff 
and Planning Commission, both of which recommended denial of the application, the 
Logan Municipal Council denied the application during its meeting on August 3, 2004. 
(R. 141-45.) Tolmans timely sought judicial review of that decision on the grounds that it 
was arbitrary and capricious. (R. 1-8.) Tolmans' complaint also alleged takings claims 
and a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.) 
Because the record before the City was more than adequate to establish the factual 
basis for the City's exercise of legislative discretion, the City sought summary judgment 
by motion filed June 22, 2005. (R. 33-145, R. 218-225.) Tolmans did not respond to the 
City's motion and memorandum, causing the trial court, on January 6, 2006, to issue an 
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order to show cause why the matter should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (R. 
149-151.) After hearing arguments why the matter should not be dismissed, the court 
granted Tolmans until April 4, 2006, to respond to the City's motion. Tolmans submitted 
their opposition memorandum on April 13, 2006. (R. 199, et. seq.) After the City 
responded, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision granting the City's motion 
based upon the arguments in its memoranda. (R. 230-31.) The Summary Judgment and 
Order of Dismissal were entered by the Court on June 12, 2006. (R. 233-34.) Tolmans 
then commenced this appeal. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tolmans' property is a single family home which was situated in a multi-family 
zone when they purchased it in 1983. (Second Amended Complaint 115, R. 3.) Six years 
later, 60 property owners petitioned the Logan City Planning Commission for a 
downzoning of properties in the area where Tolmans' property lies from R3 to R2. 
(R. 50-53.) The petitioners were concerned with various issues including preservation of 
the single-family residential character of their properties, privacy issues, decreasing 
single-family residential property values, effects of increased density, and problems posed 
by absentee landlords. (Id.) 
The Planning Commission considered the rezoning proposal and unanimously 
recommended approval to the Municipal Council. (R. 55-59.) At the meeting, the 
Commission received a second petition presented by additional homeowners requesting 
that the zoning change include their properties. (Id.) 
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After a public hearing on October 19, 1989, the Municipal Council voted 
unanimously to rezone the properties to R2. (R. 60-63.) The ordinance was approved by 
the Mayor on November 2,1989. (Ordinance 89-52, R. 64-65.) Tolmans did not 
challenge the zoning amendment, although it affected their property as well as that of 
many others. 
The City subsequently engaged in two years of study after which the Municipal 
Council adopted a revised General Plan for the City of Logan on June 16,1995. (R. 66-
88.) Consistent with the General Plan, the Council adopted a zoning map and Land 
Development Ordinance on March 6,1996. (Id.) The General Plan recognizes the 
tension between single family residences and multi-family uses within neighborhoods and 
the City's efforts to balance the interests involved. 
Logan is a City of neighborhoods. Prior to preparing the General 
Plan, the City Council and Planning Commission were facing 
requests from each of the City's residential neighborhoods to 
decrease the permitted density for new residential development. The 
actions sought, called downzoning requests, were intended to stop 
the proliferation of fourplex residential development in what were 
basically established single family neighborhoods. 
Zoning is an ongoing process intended to recognize changes in 
community values and development needs. The City invested 
extensive time and emotional energy into consideration of zone 
changes in each neighborhood. The General Plan calls for new 
zoning districts, which requires an area-by-area evaluation of the 
City to determine which new zoning district is applied to what area. 
The issues and concerns that generated the reductions in densities 
during the early 1990s had not changed at the time the General Plan 
was proposed for adoption in 1995. These values and concerns are 
still a part of the evaluation process for zone changes. 
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The greatest challenge in the General Plan is to balance the need for 
housing with desire to maintain neighborhood character. 
(Logan City General Plan, relevant portions appearing at R. 66-88.) Under the new 
ordinance, Tolmans' property and those of others which had been zoned R2 in 1989 were 
now designated as SFR (single-family residential). 
On June 24, 2004, Tolmans applied to the City for rezoning of their property and 
properties of others, including a total of 32 properties over approximately 8 acres, on 
June 24, 2004. (R. 102-105.) Pursuant to statutory authorization at Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9-303(6)(b) (effective at the time), the City's Land Development Code mandates that 
City officials approve land use applications only if they are consistent with the provisions 
of the General Plan. (Land Development Code § 17.01.040.) Tolmans did not apply for 
amendment to the General Plan as provided by Chapter 17.52 of the City's Land 
Development Code. At the time of Tolmans' application for rezone, the City was 
conducting studies for the preparation of a new General Plan. 
The City's planning staff evaluated the Tolman application and recognized that 
multi-family use would likely be the best use in the area and that the preliminary findings 
in the general plan revision process would probably support the rezoning. (R. 106-109.) 
The staff believed the rezone request was premature, implying that it might be more 
appropriate under the revised general plan. (Id.) The staff also recognized the mandatory 
requirement that rezoning be consistent with the general plan and believed that a rezoning 
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in this context might constitute illegal spot zoning. (Id.) Ultimately, the staff 
recommended denial of the rezoning because it was incompatible with the express 
provision of the General Plan objective to "restore the single family scale, character, and 
stability to the area." (Id.) 
The Planning Commission considered Tolmans' rezoning request on July 22, 2004. 
It voted unanimously, with one abstention, to recommend to the Council denial of the 
application. (R. 110-136.) On August 3, 2004, the Municipal Council considered the 
zoning application. The minutes establish that denial was recommended on the basis of 
lack of conformity with the General Plan. 
The staff recommendation to deny the rezone was made because of 
the belief that Mr. Tolman's request was contraiy to the current 
General Plan and 1996 citywide rezone. The Planning Commission 
also recommended denial, finding that the request was incompatible 
with the current General Plan and not supported by other planning 
documents, including the 1996 rezone. 
The Council set a public hearing on the request for August 24, 2004. (R. 137-140.) 
At the public hearing, a majority of individuals opposed the downzoning. After 
discussion, the Council voted unanimously to deny the rezoning request based on the staff 
and commission recommendations, which were in turn based upon noncompliance with 
the General Plan. (R. 141-45.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The real and relatively narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether the trial 
court correctly concluded that the City's denial in 2004 of Tolmans' rezoning request was 
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not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Under governing Utah law, the City's denial of the 
rezoning request based on inconsistency with the General Plan is, by definition, not 
arbitrary, capricious or illegal. The trial court's conclusion on this issue was correct and 
should therefore be affirmed. 
Tolmans insist that the City's 1989 and 1995 zoning decisions are not barred by 
statutes of limitation. There are two problems with that argument. First, they make it for 
the first time on appeal. Secondly, it is based upon a claim that the City did not preserve 
its statute of limitations defense in its answer, an allegation that is not correct (R. 30-31). 
Tolmans' complaint also alleges, in cursory fashion, a takings claim and a due 
process claim. The City addressed those claims in its memorandum in support of its 
motion (R. 42-47), but Tolmans did not respond to the City's arguments in their 
opposition memorandum. (R. 199-216.) By not presenting the trial court with legal 
arguments to support these claims, Tolmans have failed to preserve those issues for 
appeal. 
Ignoring the real nature of the issues, Tolmans chose at the trial court level and 
again here to focus their arguments on a claim that the City's denial of a downzoning for 
a total of 32 separate parcels covering 8 acres somehow constitutes "reverse spot zoning." 
This argument has several flaws. First, it illustrates that Tolmans do not understand the 
legal technicalities of spot zoning. For example, the cases which find illegal reverse spot 
zoning in the context of the denial of zoning applications are few and far between and do 
not fit the facts of this case, despite Tolman's arguments. Secondly, Tolmans ignore the 
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case law in which the decision to deny was based upon the provisions of a comprehensive 
general plan, as is the case here. Those cases hold that decisions consistent with existing, 
legislatively adopted comprehensive plans, even if they appear to contain elements of spot 
zoning, do not constitute illegal spot zoning. Another problem with Tolmans' spot 
zoning argument at the trial court, and with their other arguments, is that Tolmans simply 
dumped a pile of legal authorities at the trial court's doorstep, providing scant legal 
analysis, with the hope or expectation that the trial court would perform their analysis for 
them. The court properly declined to do so. 
The real issue presented here, and the one properly decided by the trial court, is 
whether denial of a rezoning request which is not consistent or compatible with the City's 
General Plan, and for which the applicant did not file a request for general plan 
amendment, is arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Under Utah law, it is not. The trial court's 
determination of this governing issue was legally correct and affirmation by this Court is 
appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE CITY'S 
DENIAL OF TOLMANS' DOWNZONING APPLICATION WAS NOT 
ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL. 
To prevail at the trial court, Tolmans had the burden to (1) overcome a statutory 
presumption of validity of the City's decision; and (2) establish that, under applicable 
law, the decision was arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001 
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(repealed 2004).1 The main problem with Tolmans' arguments is that they ignored at the 
trial court, and continue to ignore here, applicable and well-established Utah case law on 
this issue, particularly Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16, 70 P.3d 47. 
The City's denial of Tolmans' request for downzoning was an exercise of 
legislative discretion. Bradley 1111 at 51. Here, we have two legislative acts involved, 
the zoning decision and the adoption of a comprehensive general plan. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 10-9a-404(4) (legislative body may adopt or reject proposed general plan). The 
Bradley court recognized that legislative zoning decisions "are entitled to particular 
deference." Id. 1112 at 50-51. Therefore, the standard for determining whether a 
legislative denial of a rezoning application is arbitrary or capricious is the "highly 
deferential" determination of whether it is reasonably debatable that the decision could 
promote the general welfare. Id. 1114 at 51-52. See also Village of Belle Terre v. Borass. 
416 U.S. 1, 4, 94 S.Ct. 1526, 1528, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974) ("If the validity of the 
legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment 
must be allowed to control.") 
In Bradley, a landowner appealed from the city's denial of his request to rezone 
property from low density residential-agricultural to higher density multi-family 
residential. The Supreme Court discussed the extensive history of its treatment of 
municipal land use decisions, noting that it had previously held that "it is 'the court's duty 
xThe statute was re-enacted as Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801 with the same legal 
standard and some explanatory codification of case law. 
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to resolve all doubts in favor' of the municipality, and the burden is on the plaintiff 
challenging a municipal land use decision to show that the municipal action was clearly 
beyond the city's power." Bradley 1112 at 51 (citation omitted). The court then discussed 
the application of the reasonably debatable standard. 
In general, because a zoning classification reflects a legislative 
policy decision, we will not interfere with that decision except in the 
most extreme cases. The guiding principle behind our interpretation 
of legislative zoning decisions is that we will not substitute our 
judgment for that of the municipality. Though a municipality may 
have a myriad of competing choices before it, the selection of one 
method of solving the problem in preference to another is entirely 
within the discretion of the city; and does not, in and of itself 
evidence an abuse of discretion. The propriety of the zoning 
decision need only be reasonably debatable. 
Bradley 11 24 at 54 (punctuation, citations omitted). 
Of particular significance to the issue before this Court, the Bradley court 
recognized the appropriateness of a legislative decision relying on the city's general plan. 
Payson City's reliance on the General Plan as a basis for its decision 
is precisely the kind of legislative decision that should be left to the 
city council and undisturbed by the judiciary. It is not up to the court 
to determine whether Payson City made the right decision or the best 
decision in relying on the General Plan . . . We evaluate only whether 
it was reasonably debatable that the decision reached would promote 
the general welfare. Payson City's reliance on the long-term policy 
preferences embodied in the General Plan satisfies the reasonably 
debatable standard. 
Bradley 1126 at 55 (emphasis added). In other words, if a city denies a rezoning based 
upon noncompliance with the general plan, that denial is, by definition, not arbitrary or 
capricious as a matter of law. 
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As in Bradley, the issue before this Court is not whether approval of Tolmans' 
rezoning request would have been a better decision. Nor is the issue whether, ultimately, 
multi-family zoning may turn out to be the better zoning for these properties. The simple 
issue is whether the City's denial based upon lack of compliance with its General Plan 
passes the arbitrary and capricious challenge. The Bradley court has already squarely 
held that it does. 
Moreover, Logan City's General Plan is not merely advisory. The Land 
Development Code mandates that any zoning amendments be consistent with the General 
Plan. In turn, the General Plan reflects the carefully weighed policy decision to support 
attempts to maintain or restore the single-family character of the SFR zones. 
Admittedly, it is possible that in the future, the General Plan may reach a different 
policy conclusion more in favor of Tolmans' position. The weighing of policy issues in 
the revision of the General Plan had not been completed at the time of the application and 
could not legally be considered the governing legislative policy of the City. That 
legislative policy was defined by the 1995 General Plan and Tolmans did not apply for an 
amendment to that General Plan. The Council was required by ordinance to follow the 
long-term policy decision reflected in the General Plan. Its action in doing so cannot be 
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arbitrary or capricious.2 The City is therefore entitled as a matter of law to summary 
judgment. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT APPROPRIATELY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON TOLMANS' TAKINGS AND DUE PROCESS CLAIMS. 
A. TOLMANS FAILED TO PRESERVE THEIR TAKINGS CLAIM 
AND DUE PROCESS CLAIM FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 
In its memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, the City 
provided legal arguments establishing that Tolmans' inverse condemnation and due 
process claims failed as a matter of law. Tolmans, in their opposition memorandum, 
failed to address any of these arguments, a fact noted by the City in its reply 
memorandum. (R. 223.) Because the City's arguments were unopposed, (1) there was no 
preservation of the issues for appeal, and (2) summary judgment on those issues was 
appropriate as a matter of law. 
2Tolmans have identified nothing done by the City which constitutes a violation of 
statutes or its ordinances and could be determined to be illegal in a § 10-9-1001 review. 
The decision to deny the rezoning is therefore not arbitrary, capricious or illegal. To the 
extent that their argument of illegality relies on their "spot zoning" argument discussed 
below, that is not what is contemplated by the statute. The current version of the land use 
act codified the definition of illegality: "A determination of illegality requires a 
determination that the decision, ordinance, or regulation violates a law, statute, or 
ordinance in effect at the time the decision was made or the ordinance or regulation 
adopted." Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801(4)(d). This is simply a codification of existing 
case law on the issue of illegality. Foutz v. City of South Jordan, 2004 UT 75, II17, 100 
P.3d 1171, 1175 (explaining "illegal" to mean violating ordinances); Springville Citizens 
for a Better Community v. City of Springville. 1999 UT 25, U 30, 979 P.2d 332, 338 
(decision illegal as violating mandatory ordinances). 
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In Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles. 2002 UT 48, 48 P.3d 968, the 
Supreme Court discussed what is necessary to preserve an issue for appeal. The primary 
consideration is that "the issue must be presented to the trial court in such a way that the 
trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue." Brookside U 14 at 972 (citation 
omitted). The Brookside court identified three factors for determining whether the trial 
court had the necessary opportunity. 
(1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion; (2) the issue must be 
specifically raised; and (3) a party must introduce supporting 
evidence or relevant legal authority. 
Brookside 1114 at 972 (citation omitted). This Court has applied the same standard. 
Hatch v. Davis. 2004 UT App 378,1156,102 P.3d 774, 787 -788. 
Here, Tolmans not only provided no "relevant legal authority," they simply 
ignored the City's analysis of their claims. Because they failed to make even a minimal 
attempt to preserve these issues at the trial court, it is appropriate for this Court to decline 
to evaluate those claims or theories. 
B. TOLMANS' ARGUMENT WITH RESPECT TO THE CITY'S 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION DEFENSE IS ADVANCED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL AND IS FACTUALLY INCORRECT. 
Tolmans make a cursory argument that the applicable statute of limitation does not 
bar their constitutional claims, i.e., that their claims are "still viable." That argument is 
made for the first time on appeal. This Court has frequently stated that "[ajbsent plain 
error or exceptional circumstances, which Plaintiff has not argued, an appellate court will 
not consider an issue-even a constitutional issue-which is raised for the first time on 
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appeal." Hatch, f 56 at 787. Tolmans' failure to address the limitations issues before the 
trial court is fatal to their appeal on those issues. 
Moreover, the fundamental premise of Tolmans' argument is factually 
unsupported. They claim that the limitations defense was not raised in the City's answer. 
The limitation defense is clearly and specifically raised in the City's answer. (R. 30, 31.) 
C. TOLMANS5 INVERSE CONDEMNATION CLAIMS FAIL AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that Tolmans' complaint sufficiently preserves 
issues for which they advanced no legal argument, the City addresses the merits of those 
claims. Tolmans claim that the 1989 decision to downzone their property and the 2004 
denial of their rezoning application constitute inverse condemnation under Article I, 
section 22. In doing so, they make two inconsistent allegations: (1) the decisions denied 
them "all economically viable use of their property," (R. 24, ^ 19), and (2) took from 
them "a major portion of the reasonably expected return on their 1983 investment in their 
home property." (R. 21-22, ^} 7, 8.) Tolmans provided no evidence to support the first 
allegation.3 The second allegation provides no support for an inverse condemnation 
claim. 
3The affidavit of Thomas W. Coleman (R. 158-197) is simply a belated and 
improper attempt to supplement the legislative record and attack the exercise of 
legislative discretion by the City Council based on information which was never 
presented to or considered by them, all in violation of the standards of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 10-9a-801(8)(a). 
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The threshold weakness in Tolmans' takings claim, however, is that the claim, to 
the extent it is based upon the 1989 downzoning, is time-barred. There is no specified 
limitation for the bringing of an Article I, section 22 takings claim, therefore, under Utah 
statute, litigation must be commenced within four years. Utah Code Ann. § 72-12-25(3). 
See Johnson v. Utah-Idaho Central Railway Co.. 249 P.1036,1041 (Utah 1926) (applying 
four-year catch-all statute to a claim for taking.) 
Moreover, Tolmans' takings claims lack legal support. The threshold inquiry in a 
takings action is whether the plaintiff has a protectable property interest. Intermountain 
Sports. Inc. v. Dept. of Transp.. 2004 UT App 405,118,103 P.3d 716, 718-19. Tolmans 
have no such interest and completely ignore Utah law on vested rights. 
"It is established that an owner of property holds it subject to zoning ordinances 
enacted pursuant to a [city's] police power." Western Land Equities. Inc. v. City of 
Logan. 617 P.2d 388, 390 (Utah 1980). See also Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 758 
P.2d 897, 901 (Utah 1988) (owner acquires protected property interest or vested right in 
current zoning only upon application for development consistent with the existing 
zoning); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 505 U.S. 1003,1027,112 S.Ct. 2886, 
2899, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992) (noting that property owners should expect uses of 
property to be restricted by legitimate use of police powers and that some rights must 
yield to the police power). Utah courts have expressly rejected unilateral expectations as 
a basis for asserting a protected property interest. E.g., Bagford v. Ephraim City. 904 
P.2d 1095, 1099 (Utah 1995) (in which court looked to federal law and other state law to 
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identify scope of protected property interest). See also Patterson v. American Fork City. 
2003 UT 7,11 23, 67 P.3d 466 (citing federal law holding that unilateral expectation is 
insufficient to create a constitutionally protected property right). Tolmans have, at best, a 
unilateral expectation that their property might be rezoned for multi-family use. 
The general rule is that, while the use and ownership of property are fundamental 
rights, a property owner has no vested, protected property right in a contemplated 
development or entitlement to a particular zoning.4 State courts which have examined the 
issue have consistently held that a property owner has no protected property right in any 
particular zoning of property, including the existing zoning absent an application for 
development under that zoning, which would support state constitutional takings or due 
process claims.5 
4Marshall v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 912 F.Supp 1456, 1464 (D. Wyo 1996); 
Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs Co. v. City of Lawrence. 715 F.Supp. 1000, 1004-05 (D. Kan. 
1989); MacDonald. Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County. 477 U.S. 340, 348-351,106 S.Ct. 
2561, 2566-2567, 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). 
5Weatherford v. City of San Marcos. 157 S.W.3d 473, 483 (Tex.App. 2004) 
(property owner has no "vested right in any particular zoning classification55); City of 
Suffolk ex rel. Herbert v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals for City of Suffolk. 580 S.E.2d 796, 798 
(Va. 2003) ("Privately held land is subject to applicable local zoning ordinances whether 
enacted before or after the property was acquired. Generally, landowners have no 
property right in anticipated uses of their land since they have no vested property right in 
the continuation of the land's existing zoning status.55); Glennon Heights. Inc. v. Central 
Bank & Trust. 658 P.2d 872, 877 (Colo. 1983) (en banc) (property owners5 interest in 
their property "does not amount to a vested right in the maintenance of a particular zoning 
classification55). 
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The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that routine regulation which has an 
impact on property value does not necessarily require compensation under Article I, 
section 22. 
Many statutes and ordinances regulate what a property owner can do 
with and on the owner's property. Those regulations may have a 
significant impact on the utility or value of the property, yet they 
generally do not require compensation under article I, section 22. 
Only when the governmental action rises to the level of a taking or 
damage under article I, section 22 is the State required to pay 
compensation. 
Colman v. Utah State Land Bd.. 795 P.2d 622, 627 (Utah 1990). 
To state a claim for relief for an alleged taking arising from application of zoning 
ordinances, a plaintiff must allege and prove that he has been deprived of all reasonable 
uses of his land. 
[F]or there to be a taking under a zoning ordinance, the landowner 
must show that he has been deprived of all reasonable uses of his 
land. For example, almost all zoning decisions have some economic 
impact on property values. However, mere diminution in property 
value is insufficient to meet the burden of demonstrating a taking by 
regulation. 
Cornish Town v. Roller. 817 P.2d 305, 311-12 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). In other 
words, a regulatory taking only occurs when there is no remaining economically viable 
use for the property. 
The state has broad authority to regulate or prevent certain uses of 
land under its police power; it need compensate a landowner only if 
the regulation deprives him or her of all economically viable use of 
the land, i.e., when it effects a "regulatory taking." 
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Nat'l Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 925 (Utah 1993) 
(emphasis added). 
The term "economically viable use" does not equate to highest and best use. For 
example, in Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245 (Utah App. 1998), the 
Court of Appeals, applying federal law which similarly requires deprivation of all 
economically viable use, concluded that a substantial reduction in value (43 percent 
reduction) did not deprive a property of economically viable use so long as some 
reasonable value remained and the reduction did not support a takings claim. 
Tolmans' takings claims fail on two counts. First, they possess no property 
interest entitled to Article I, section 22 protection. Secondly, they also are unable to 
produce any evidence that they have no remaining economically viable use of their 
property. In reality, the fact that they own property within the City, located in a 
residential zone, strongly supports the conclusion that there is substantial value to the 
property for the purposes for which it is currently zoned. There is no evidence that the 
denial of the rezoning even diminished the value of the property. Moreover, any claim of 
reduced value based upon the 1989 downzoning is time-barred. 
D. TOLMANS' ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 DUE PROCESS CLAIMS ARE 
FACTUALLY AND LEGALLY UNSUPPORTED. 
Tolmans' second amended complaint alleges due process violations under 
Article I, section 7. They do not even bother to identify whether these are procedural or 
substantive due process claims. There is nothing in their Second Amended Complaint 
20 
which would support a procedural due process claim and, in fact, the record establishes 
that they were afforded procedural due process.6 
The first step in a due process analysis is, as in the takings analysis, the 
identification of a constitutionally protected property interest. State in Interest of 
Summers v. Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980). As discussed above, Tolmans 
have no such interest. See City of Livonia v. Dept. of Social Services, 333 N.W.2d 151, 
160-61 (Mich.App. 1983) ("the mere fact that the individual plaintiffs may have relied 
upon the continuance of existing zoning does not give them a property interest entitling 
them to due process protection."); W.C.& A.N. Miller Dev. Co. v. Dist. of Columbia 
Zoning Comm'n, 340 A.2d 420, 424 (D.C. 1975) ("while property rights may not be 
taken away without due process of law, a property owner has no right to a particular 
zoning classification of his property.55) Absent a legally cognizable property interest, 
Tolmans5 due process claims fail as a matter of law. 
Moreover, in a substantive due process challenge, a zoning ordinance will be 
upheld under the reasonably debatable standard applicable to the arbitrary and capricious 
analysis discussed above. 
In reviewing [a] substantive due process challenge, we focus not on 
the ordinance's alleged or potential effects, but on the ordinance 
itself and the reasons given by [the] City for its enactment. 
6Any due process claims based upon the 1989 downzoning are also time-barred 
because they were not brought within two years. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-28(4). To the 
extent that § 78-12-28 may be deemed prospective only, then the extant catchall four-year 
provision in § 78-12-25(3) applies. 
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If the ordinance and the stated policies and reasons underlying it do, 
within reason, debatably promote the legitimate goals of increased 
public health, safety or general welfare, we must allow [the] City's 
legislative judgment to control. 
Smith Investment at 253. It is well-established law that courts do not substitute their 
judgment for that of the city's legislative body. Id. at 253. 
The record provides more than adequate evidence that the City's zoning decision is 
at least debatably reasonable. In fact, the Supreme Court in Bradley has concluded that 
legislative reliance on the General Plan as a basis for denying a rezoning is, by definition, 
reasonably debatable and not arbitrary or capricious. There is, therefore, no basis for 
Tolmans' substantive due process claims. 
III. THE CITY'S DENIAL OF TOLMAN'S DOWNZONING REQUEST WAS 
NOT ILLEGAL "REVERSE SPOT ZONING." 
As a threshold issue, it is at least debatable whether Tolmans adequately preserved 
their "reverse spot zoning" argument. What they presented to the trial court was an 
annotation, Dennison, "Determination whether zoning or rezoning a particular parcel 
constitutes illegal spot zoning," 73 A.L.R. 5th 223 (1999) and excerpts from the 
annotation with absolutely no legal analysis. (R. 210-214.) It is questionable whether 
this constitutes provision of "relevant legal authority," since the annotation cites cases 
both in favor of and against Tolmans' position. For example, § 12 of the annotation 
contains 41 cases in which spot zoning has been found to exist where the parcel was 
zoned more restrictively than surrounding property and § 13 contains 34 cases where the 
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opposite conclusion was reached. Absent some kind of legal analysis, citation to the 
annotation is meaningless. Utah Courts have consistently refused to perform a party's 
analysis where the party has failed to do so. E.g., Midvale City Corp. v. Haltomu 2003 
UT 26,1175, 73 P.3d 334, 349 (without analysis, court is unable to make an informed 
decision). After those excerpts, Tolmans discuss Utah cases which are immaterial to the 
argument they advance. 
Admittedly, Tolmans have done a better job on appeal of actually looking at some 
of the cases cited in the annotation and extracting language from those cases. It is, 
however, questionable whether the trial court was afforded any meaningful opportunity to 
make an informed decision on the spot zoning argument for purposes of preserving the 
argument for appeal. 
Aside from the preservation issue, Tolmans' arguments fail to comprehend the 
essence of "reverse spot zoning." This is evidenced in part by their citation to Penn 
Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 
(1978). Contrary to Tolmans' characterization, the U.S. Supreme Court did not "adopt[] 
the illegal 'reverse spot' zoning doctrine applicable here." (Applt's Brf. p. 11.) The Penn 
Central court simply explained that reverse spot zoning is "a land use decision which 
arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel for different, less favorable treatment than 
neighboring ones." Penn Central 438 U.S. at 132, 98 S.Ct. at 2663. The court then 
distinguished spot zoning as the "antithesis of land-use control as part of some 
comprehensive plan." Id. The Penn Central court found no illegal spot zoning because 
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the decision to deny development was based upon an existing comprehensive land 
development plan. 
A respected land use treatise defines and discusses the concept of reverse spot 
zoning. 
This phrase refers to an arbitrary zoning or rezoning of a small tract 
of land that is not consistent with the comprehensive land use plan 
and that uniquely burdens an individual owner largely to secure some 
public benefit. Reverse spot zoning usually results from the 
downzoning of a tract of land to a less intensive use classification 
than that imposed on nearby properties. 
1 Ziegler, Rathkopf s The Law of Zoning and Planning, (1996, supp. 2001) § 1:40 
at 1-53. The key issues are arbitrary zoning, small tracts, unique burden on "an individual 
owner," and the purpose to secure a "public benefit." The treatise further discusses 
reverse spot zoning as the use of zoning to acquire for the public or adjoining property 
owners specific benefits without reciprocal benefit to the property owner. 3 Ziegler 
§ 38:17 at 38-14 to 38-16. The treatise also concludes, as did the Penn Central court, that 
zoning decisions consistent with a general plan are not spot zoning. 
Zoning in accordance with a comprehensive plan promotes the 
public welfare by providing for an orderly and integrated 
development process. By definition, therefore, spot zoning is the 
antithesis of planned zoning. Rezoning individual tracts or small 
parcels of land will be held invalid when not enacted in accordance 
with a comprehensive plan. 
3 Ziegler § 41:4 at 41-13 to 41-14. 
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Nor is the "island" argument made by Tolmans determinative of the issue of spot 
zoning. 
Usually spot zoning involves a small parcel of land, the larger the 
property the more difficult it is to sustain an allegation of spot 
zoning. Likewise, where the 'spot' is not an island but is connected 
on some sides to a like zone the allegation of spot zoning is more 
difficult to establish since lines must be drawn at some point. Even 
where a small island is created in the midst of less restrictive zoning, 
the zoning may be upheld where rational reason in the public benefit 
exists for such a classification. 
Consaul v. City of San Diego, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 775 (Cal.App. 1992) (citations omitted). 
It is significant that the property at issue here is not a single, small parcel of land but 32 
distinct properties. 
As recognized by Rathkopf s and the Penn Central court, the key to whether what 
might other wise amount to spot zoning is discriminatory is whether the zoning decision 
is made in the context of a comprehensive general plan. Here, the materiality of the 
general plan is enhanced by the fact that the City, by mandatory ordinance which it cannot 
ignore, see Springville Citizens, supra, was required to approve the rezoning application 
only if it was consistent with the provisions of the general plan. That makes it all the 
more significant that Tolmans did not apply for a general plan amendment which would 
pave the way for their downzoning request. 
Also significant here is that, though Tolmans argue the issues with respect to their 
property, the application denied by the City was for rezoning of 32 separate parcels, not 
just the Tolman property. This points out the inherent weakness of the Tolmans' 
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argument that their property is surrounded by lower density uses and is isolated because 
of those uses. 
It is difficult to understand why Tolmans discuss the Utah cases which they cite. 
For instance, contrary to their statement that "[t]hree Utah cases have accepted, defined 
and distinguished the applicable principle of illegal 'reverse spot zoning,55' (Aplfs Brf 
p. 13), no Utah case, reported or unreported, contains the term "reverse spot zoning.55 
Also, the Utah cases do not base a determination of spot zoning on property uses in 
general, including nonconforming uses, but rather focus on differences in "permitted 
use,55 i.e., those uses identified and permitted by zoning classification rather than a request 
for the favorable exercise of legislative discretion to change the zoning. See Donner 
Crest Condominium Homeowners Ass5n v. Salt Lake City, 2005 UT App 163, 2005 WL 
775306 at *4. The specific holding in Donner Crest was that "the Planning Commission 
did not single out the Van Cott project for a separate zoning classification or allow Van 
Cott a use inconsistent with neighboring projects.55 Id. (emphasis added). 
The discussion in Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass5n, Inc. v. Engh Floral 
Co., 545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976) similarly involved discussion of "permitted uses55 which 
differ from permitted uses in the zoning district overall. Crestview-Holladay at 1151. 
While the Crestview-Holladay court discussed the spot zoning issue on which the trial 
court ruled, the Supreme Court did not expressly rule on that issue, instead expressing the 
opinion that "[i]t is doubtful that the term 'spot zoning5 applies to this case in view of the 
size of the tract.55 Id. Rather, it recognized that its review was limited to determining 
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whether the zoning decision was arbitrary, capricious or illegal. Id. at 1152. It expressly 
held that the plaintiff failed to establish that the decision was arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal. Id. Applied to this case, Crestview-Holladay supports the City's position that 
zoning is not the issue, but rather whether the City's decision was arbitrary, capricious or 
illegal under § 10-9-1001 or § 10-9a-801. 
The action in Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 797 (Utah App. 1992) 
had a procedural posture nowhere near the Tolmans' case. In Ben Hame, the town was 
enforcing its existing zoning regulation by prohibiting use of a single-family residence for 
commercial ski lodging. The spot zoning issue arose only as a defense in its answer and 
advanced by expert affidavit with respect to a long-established zoning ordinance. The 
claim was that the zoning of the entire subdivision constituted illegal spot zoning. The 
court did not expressly rule on the spot zoning issue because it held that Ben Hame's 
arguments were conclusory and lacked factual support. It did note, however, that the area 
was universally zoned the same, despite some dissimilarity in uses, indicating a lack of 
spot zoning. Id. at 805 n.7. 
Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 141 P.2d 704 (Utah 1943) is more helpful to the City's 
position than to Tolmans'. The court expressly identified the issue in Marshall: 
Can a city, as part of a general zoning plan, create small districts, for 
the purpose of placing within convenient distance of the inhabitants 
of the residential district certain small businesses, handling daily 
conveniences and necessities for the home? 
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Marshall at 704 (emphasis added). The Marshall court distinguished small parcel zoning 
pursuant to a general plan from illegal spot zoning undertaken "without regard to a 
unified plan." Id. at 711. As in other Utah cases, the court noted that spot zoning 
consisted of "specially zoned" areas within larger districts. By implication, it does not 
cover property such as Tolmans' which lie within a single zoning district but might be 
restricted to a use different from some surrounding uses which exist as nonconforming 
uses. In other words, as in Marshall, there is no target or special zoning involved here. 
A Utah case which Tolmans chose not to cite is Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt 
Lake City, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949). In Phi Kappa, the court recognized two important 
realities of zoning. First, zoning is a legislative decision afforded broad discretion. Id. at 
181. Secondly, "spot zoning" is not necessarily an evil, but may occur upon proper 
exercise of legislative discretion. 
Zoning necessarily involves boundary problems and, when 'spot' 
zoning is permitted in a residential district, the legislative body must 
determine where the boundary is to be placed, attempting, as far as 
possible, to minimize the resulting inconveniences. This is 
essentially a legislative problem, and the determination may be 
attacked only if there is no reasonable basis therefor. Often there 
may be little difference in the character of the property on either side 
of the line, but such a showing will not justify a judicial alteration or 
extension of the boundaries. 
Phi Kappa at 181-82. There the court found no discriminatory spot zoning in the 
application of a restriction on residential use of property in a boundary area next to public 
educational institutions. 
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Tolmans' other cited authorities are of little help in this context. For example, 
there is no value in a citation to an annotation which contains case law both pro and con 
and must be sorted out by analysis of the fact and surrounding legal constraints. Nor is 
there much guidance from the individual cases cited by Tolmans. For example, the four-
part test identified in Dufau v. Jefferson Parish, 200 So. 2d 335 (La. App. 1967) (Aplt's 
Brf pp. 19-20) was expressly abrogated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Palermo Land 
Co., Inc. v. Planning Comm'n of Calcasieu Parish. 561 So.2d 482 (La. 1990). In 
particular, the Louisiana high court rejected the shifting of the burden of proof to the 
municipality. Palermo Land at 489-90. Moreover, Dufau involved an affirmative change 
in the zoning ordinance assigning the property a more restrictive use, not a denial of a 
zone change as is the case here. The issue for the Louisiana courts, however, is whether 
the property is singled out and changed to a zoning classification different from the 
properties surrounding it. Palermo Land at 490. 
None of the cases cited by Tolmans was decided in the context of an existing, 
comprehensive general plan. There is no reference to a general plan as the basis for the 
municipality's decision in City Comm'n of the City of Miami v. Woodland Park 
Cemetery Co.. 553 So.2d 1227 (Fla. App. 1989). The issue in Woodland Park turned on 
the fact that the properties surrounding the property at issue were actually zoned at a 
lower density than the subject property. That is not the case here. The zoning designation 
applies uniformly. The fact that there are higher density uses which existed under prior 
zoning classifications merely makes those uses nonconforming. In Woodland Park, the 
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plaintiff was denied a similar zoning classification as the surrounding properties. Not so 
here. 
The only discussion of a comprehensive plan in Ross v. City of Yorba Linda, 2 
Cal.Rptr. 2d 638 (Cal.App. 1991) is the City's amendment of its general plan after the 
property owners commenced the challenge to the zoning ordinance. The fact that the 
comprehensive plan did not preclude the use proposed by the plaintiff played a part in the 
court's decision that the higher density zoning was arbitrary. 
In Trust Co. of Chicago v. City of Chicago. 96 N.E.2d 499 (111. 1951), the 
challenge was to an upzoning which was passed without reference to provisions of a 
comprehensive general plan. The issue there turned on whether it was appropriate for the 
City to increase zoning intensity for the benefit of a few owners in the area, an issue 
consistent with the general definition of reverse spot zoning discussed above. 
Courts which have considered small parcel zoning issues in the context of a 
comprehensive general plan have held that no spot zoning occurs where the decision is in 
conformance with the general plan. Sullivan v. Town of Acton, 645 N.E.2d 700, 702 
(Mass.App. 1995) (decision consistent with "long-range study and recommendations by 
the planning board"); Miller v. Town of Tilton, 655 A.2d 409, 411 (N.H. 1995) 
(affirming trial court ruling that zoning amendment was consistent with general plan and 
therefore not spot zoning); Hyland v. Mayor and Township Comm. of Morris Township, 
327 A.2d 675, 678 (NJ.App. 1974) ("We perceive no substance to plaintiffs' argument 
that the amendatory ordinance deviates from the comprehensive plan to which zoning 
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ordinances should conform and thus constituted 'spot zoning."5) Recognizing, as did the 
Penn Central court that spot zoning is the "antithesis of planned zoning," the New York 
Supreme Court held that an ordinance conforming to a general plan is not spot zoning 
even if it creates the appearance of spot zoning. 
Nothing in the record warrants classification of the board's action, as 
spot zoning, which has been defined as the process of singling out a 
small parcel of land for a use classification totally different from that 
of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner of such property 
and to the detriment of other owners. . . . [S]pot zoning is the very 
antithesis of planned zoning. If, therefore, an ordinance is enacted in 
accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan, it is not 'spot zoning,' 
even though it (1) singles out and affects but one small plot or (2) 
creates in the center of a large zone small areas or districts devoted 
to a different use. 
Dauerheim. Inc. v. Town Bd. of Town of Hempstead, 310 N.E.2d 516, 518 (N.Y. 1974). 
In this matter we have several elements which preclude a finding of reverse spot 
zoning in the City's denial of Tolmans' rezoning application. First, we are not dealing 
with a single parcel but rather with 32 separate parcels. As noted by the California court 
in Consaul, the existence of multiple parcels makes the spot zoning argument difficult to 
carry. The zoning at issue here is uniformly single-family residential, despite the fact that 
there are nonconforming uses which pre-existed the ordinance. The City has not zoned 
adjoining parcels differently, a prerequisite for spot zoning. The decision by the Council 
was not a downzoning or an upzoning, but simply a decision not to change the current 
zoning classification. Tolmans' property was not targeted for a particular benefit nor the 
subject of a benefit to adjoining landowners or the City. Finally, the decision is, pursuant 
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to legislative mandate, consistent with the general plan. Though Tolmans could have 
sought an amendment to the general plan to accommodate their downzoning request, they 
did not do so. Under Utah law, the City had no choice but to follow the mandatory 
provisions of its ordinance and deny the rezoning request. 
CONCLUSION 
The only legitimate issue here is whether the City's denial of Tolmans5 
downzoning request was arbitrary, capricious or illegal under applicable Utah law. The 
trial court properly applied that well-established law and reached the correct conclusion 
that it was not. Tolmans' other claims are barred, either by their failure to preserve them 
at the trial court or by applicable statutes of limitation. The primary argument upon 
which Tolmans rely, that the decision of the City somehow constitutes illegal reverse spot 
zoning, fails as a matter of law. It is therefore appropriate for this Court to affirm the 
decision of the trial court. The City respectfully requests that it do so. 
Dated this of December, 2006. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
'of^/w^K 
nett 
neys'for Defendant/Appellee 
ran City 
132137.1 
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